Michael Faraday
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/faraday_michael.shtml
Thomas Edison
http://www.biography.com/people/thomas-edison-9284349
Nikola Tesla
http://www.biography.com/people/nikola-tesla-9504443
http://theoatmeal.com/comics/tesla
Saturday, May 30, 2015
Tuesday, May 26, 2015
Oil led to Pearl Harbor by David L. Roll
http://www.salon.com/2013/12/05/oil_led_to_pearl_harbor/
Few people realize that it was oil — the shortage of oil — that precipitated the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Tensions between the United States and Japan were rising throughout that fateful year. Having initiated a war with China (America’s ally) and occupied Indochina, Japan’s totalitarian government was intent on imposing its will on all of the people of East Asia.
In the summer of 1941, before leaving for Placentia Bay, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had ordered a freeze on Japanese assets. That measure required the Japanese to seek and obtain licenses to export and pay for each shipment of goods from the United States, including oil.
This move was most distressing to the Japanese because they were dependent on the United States for most of their crude oil and refined petroleum products. However, Roosevelt did not want to trigger a war with Japan. His intention was to keep the oil flowing by continuing to grant licenses.
Roosevelt had a noose around Japan’s neck, but he chose not to tighten it. He was not ready to cut off its oil lifeline for fear that such a move would be regarded as tantamount to an act of war.
That summer, while Roosevelt, his trusted adviser Harry Hopkins and U.S. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles were attending the shipboard conference off Newfoundland and Secretary of State Cordell Hull was on vacation at the Greenbrier in West Virginia, the authority to grant licenses to export and pay for oil and other goods was in the hands of a three-person interagency committee. It was dominated by Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, whom one historian described as the “quintessential opportunist of U.S. foreign policy in 1941.”
Acheson favored a “bullet-proof freeze” on oil shipments to Japan, claiming it would not provoke war because “no rational Japanese could believe that an attack on us could result in anything but disaster for his country.”
With breathtaking confidence in his own judgment, and ignoring the objections of others in the State Department, Acheson refused to grant licenses to Japan to pay for goods in dollars. That effectively ended Japan’s ability to ship oil and all other goods from the United States.
Acheson’s actions cut off all American trade with Japan. When Roosevelt returned, he decided not to overturn the “state of affairs” initiated by Acheson, apparently because he feared he would otherwise be regarded as an appeaser. Once Roosevelt perpetuated Acheson’s trade embargo, the planners in Japan’s imperial military headquarters knew that oil to fuel their fleet, as well as rubber, rice and other vital reserves, would soon run out. By the end of the year at the latest, Japan would need to capture new supply sources in the oil-rich Dutch East Indies, which the United States would surely oppose. And to protect its long exposed flank as it moved south, the Japanese Navy would have to deliver a knockout blow to U.S. naval and air power in the Pacific.
Without oil, Japan could not survive a long war. The blow would be delivered at Pearl Harbor.
Throughout the summer and autumn, the First Carrier Division of the Japanese Navy secretly practiced low-level torpedo bombing in Kagoshima Bay, which bore a resemblance to Pearl Harbor. The plans for the Pearl Harbor attack were being developed by Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, an innovative thinker with what the historian Gordon Prange has called “a gambler’s heart.”
In September 1941, Japan’s prime minister, Prince Konoye Fumimaro, who had been urging a personal meeting with the president to reach a peace agreement, was almost assassinated by pro-war fanatics wielding ceremonial knives. Weakened by the attempt to overthrow him and losing power and influence to militarist elements, Prince Konoye’s government fell on October 16, less than two months before the attack. That day, meeting with Harry Hopkins and his top military advisors, FDR expressed concern that the new Japanese government would be “much more anti-American” than the old. Sure enough, two days later General Tojo Hideki, leader of the militarists and the minister of war, became Japan’s prime minister.
Anticipating a move southward by the Japanese, the United States began reinforcing its air forces in the Philippines and constructing a chain of airfields from Hawaii toward Australia and the Philippines. These moves provided hard evidence to support Tojo’s arguments for war as soon as possible.
In Washington, Ambassador Nomura begged to be relieved after Tojo took over the government. He was ordered to stay on and continue to offer elaborate proposals for settling the looming crisis, proposals that Tojo knew would be rejected by the United States. The Japanese offered to reverse their aggressive designs on Indochina and to begin to withdraw troops under two conditions: first, if peace with China was achieved without interference by the United States (in other words, on Japan’s terms) — and second, if the United States restored trade in oil and other resources.
The United States could not possibly agree to this because it would amount to an abandonment of China and its Nationalist government. For its part, the Roosevelt administration, as the price for lifting trade sanctions, continued to insist that Japan withdraw its troops from China and Indochina and reconsider its commitment to the Tripartite Pact (by which Japan would declare war if the United States joined in the European war against Germany).
In the final days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. Secretary of State Hull also proposed that in any settlement with China, the United States and Japan would agree to recognize no Chinese government other than that of the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek. There was not the slightest chance that Tojo would accept these proposals.
Nomura pleaded with Tojo for more time to negotiate, but he refused, saying a settlement agreement with the United States must be signed by November 29. “After that, things are automatically going to happen.”
At a cabinet meeting on November 7, Hull warned that Japan might attack at any time. Roosevelt ordered him to keep the negotiationsgoing and to “do nothing to precipitate a crisis.”
On November 22, Admiral Yamamoto ordered the First Carrier Division at Hitokappu Bay in the Kuriles, north of Japan’s main islands, to “move out…on 26 November and proceed without being detected to the evening rendezvous point…set for 3 December. X-day will be December 8 [Japanese time].”
At a large rally in Tokyo on November 30, Prime Minister Tojo incited the crowd, claiming that the United States and Britain, in order to “satisfy their greed,” were preventing development of the “East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” “We must purge this…practice from East Asia with a vengeance,” Tojo said. It was this speech that caused Roosevelt to cut short a belated Thanksgiving in Warm Springs, Georgia, and return to Washington the next day.
David L. Roll, an attorney and contributor to The Globalist, where this feature first appeared, is the author of “The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins and the Forging of the Alliance to Defeat Hitler” (2013).
Few people realize that it was oil — the shortage of oil — that precipitated the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Tensions between the United States and Japan were rising throughout that fateful year. Having initiated a war with China (America’s ally) and occupied Indochina, Japan’s totalitarian government was intent on imposing its will on all of the people of East Asia.
In the summer of 1941, before leaving for Placentia Bay, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had ordered a freeze on Japanese assets. That measure required the Japanese to seek and obtain licenses to export and pay for each shipment of goods from the United States, including oil.
This move was most distressing to the Japanese because they were dependent on the United States for most of their crude oil and refined petroleum products. However, Roosevelt did not want to trigger a war with Japan. His intention was to keep the oil flowing by continuing to grant licenses.
Roosevelt had a noose around Japan’s neck, but he chose not to tighten it. He was not ready to cut off its oil lifeline for fear that such a move would be regarded as tantamount to an act of war.
That summer, while Roosevelt, his trusted adviser Harry Hopkins and U.S. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles were attending the shipboard conference off Newfoundland and Secretary of State Cordell Hull was on vacation at the Greenbrier in West Virginia, the authority to grant licenses to export and pay for oil and other goods was in the hands of a three-person interagency committee. It was dominated by Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, whom one historian described as the “quintessential opportunist of U.S. foreign policy in 1941.”
Acheson favored a “bullet-proof freeze” on oil shipments to Japan, claiming it would not provoke war because “no rational Japanese could believe that an attack on us could result in anything but disaster for his country.”
With breathtaking confidence in his own judgment, and ignoring the objections of others in the State Department, Acheson refused to grant licenses to Japan to pay for goods in dollars. That effectively ended Japan’s ability to ship oil and all other goods from the United States.
Acheson’s actions cut off all American trade with Japan. When Roosevelt returned, he decided not to overturn the “state of affairs” initiated by Acheson, apparently because he feared he would otherwise be regarded as an appeaser. Once Roosevelt perpetuated Acheson’s trade embargo, the planners in Japan’s imperial military headquarters knew that oil to fuel their fleet, as well as rubber, rice and other vital reserves, would soon run out. By the end of the year at the latest, Japan would need to capture new supply sources in the oil-rich Dutch East Indies, which the United States would surely oppose. And to protect its long exposed flank as it moved south, the Japanese Navy would have to deliver a knockout blow to U.S. naval and air power in the Pacific.
Without oil, Japan could not survive a long war. The blow would be delivered at Pearl Harbor.
Throughout the summer and autumn, the First Carrier Division of the Japanese Navy secretly practiced low-level torpedo bombing in Kagoshima Bay, which bore a resemblance to Pearl Harbor. The plans for the Pearl Harbor attack were being developed by Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, an innovative thinker with what the historian Gordon Prange has called “a gambler’s heart.”
In September 1941, Japan’s prime minister, Prince Konoye Fumimaro, who had been urging a personal meeting with the president to reach a peace agreement, was almost assassinated by pro-war fanatics wielding ceremonial knives. Weakened by the attempt to overthrow him and losing power and influence to militarist elements, Prince Konoye’s government fell on October 16, less than two months before the attack. That day, meeting with Harry Hopkins and his top military advisors, FDR expressed concern that the new Japanese government would be “much more anti-American” than the old. Sure enough, two days later General Tojo Hideki, leader of the militarists and the minister of war, became Japan’s prime minister.
Anticipating a move southward by the Japanese, the United States began reinforcing its air forces in the Philippines and constructing a chain of airfields from Hawaii toward Australia and the Philippines. These moves provided hard evidence to support Tojo’s arguments for war as soon as possible.
In Washington, Ambassador Nomura begged to be relieved after Tojo took over the government. He was ordered to stay on and continue to offer elaborate proposals for settling the looming crisis, proposals that Tojo knew would be rejected by the United States. The Japanese offered to reverse their aggressive designs on Indochina and to begin to withdraw troops under two conditions: first, if peace with China was achieved without interference by the United States (in other words, on Japan’s terms) — and second, if the United States restored trade in oil and other resources.
The United States could not possibly agree to this because it would amount to an abandonment of China and its Nationalist government. For its part, the Roosevelt administration, as the price for lifting trade sanctions, continued to insist that Japan withdraw its troops from China and Indochina and reconsider its commitment to the Tripartite Pact (by which Japan would declare war if the United States joined in the European war against Germany).
In the final days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. Secretary of State Hull also proposed that in any settlement with China, the United States and Japan would agree to recognize no Chinese government other than that of the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek. There was not the slightest chance that Tojo would accept these proposals.
Nomura pleaded with Tojo for more time to negotiate, but he refused, saying a settlement agreement with the United States must be signed by November 29. “After that, things are automatically going to happen.”
At a cabinet meeting on November 7, Hull warned that Japan might attack at any time. Roosevelt ordered him to keep the negotiationsgoing and to “do nothing to precipitate a crisis.”
On November 22, Admiral Yamamoto ordered the First Carrier Division at Hitokappu Bay in the Kuriles, north of Japan’s main islands, to “move out…on 26 November and proceed without being detected to the evening rendezvous point…set for 3 December. X-day will be December 8 [Japanese time].”
At a large rally in Tokyo on November 30, Prime Minister Tojo incited the crowd, claiming that the United States and Britain, in order to “satisfy their greed,” were preventing development of the “East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” “We must purge this…practice from East Asia with a vengeance,” Tojo said. It was this speech that caused Roosevelt to cut short a belated Thanksgiving in Warm Springs, Georgia, and return to Washington the next day.
David L. Roll, an attorney and contributor to The Globalist, where this feature first appeared, is the author of “The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins and the Forging of the Alliance to Defeat Hitler” (2013).
Sunday, May 24, 2015
liz clark and her voyage around the globe
her web site
http://swellvoyage.com/
her story
http://thugvirals.com/this-amazing-woman-lives-the-dream-sailing-around-the-world-and-wants-you-to-join/
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/travel/travel_news/article-3062136
http://swellvoyage.com/
her story
http://thugvirals.com/this-amazing-woman-lives-the-dream-sailing-around-the-world-and-wants-you-to-join/
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/travel/travel_news/article-3062136
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
抠图
简单， 找个随便什么单色背景都可以
ps里这样
1 ctr+j copy layer 防止砸了
2 select -> color range->点吸管选区背景颜色， 选择后按OK
3 按住shift+i inverse selection（你要选的是你的大头）
4 select->modify->contract 一个pixel或者2个pixel（沿着轮廓缩进去一两个像素， 精选边沿）
5 ctrl+j copy
6 create a new layer, fill color(usually blue)拖到复制出来的大头下面就可以了
找个单色背景拍照，尽量和人的反差大点
ps打开图片，把那个background解锁成一个可编辑的图层
在通道面板里面找个人和背景反差最大（背景最白，人最黑）的通道（比如blue)，复制一份
选中复制的通道（blue copy），ctrl+I 反色，这时候背景是黑的，人是灰度的（黑头发的地方白，其他地方看原来颜色深浅灰度不同，颜色越浅越黑）
可以ctrl+M调调曲线让反差更大（背景更黑）
确认背景色是白色，前景色是黑色，然后用橡皮擦小心翼翼的把人擦白（凡是白色的都会进选区），边缘小心点，然后颠倒前景色和背景色，用橡皮擦吧背景擦黑
做完了选中RGB通道,回到图层面板，Select--->load selection
弹出窗口里面channel选你复制和编辑过的那个通道（比如blue copy），ok
这时候选区就好了
ctrl+shift+J,把选好的地方抠出来变成新图层
选取原来的图层（扣掉一块那个，layer 0），shift+f5填充一个你想要的颜色，然后调调颜色透明度之类如果需要的话
合并图层，保存
其实选区是关键，所以擦黑擦白的时候决定了最后选区的准确性，擦错了也会缺一块或者多一块
这个办法只适合于对象和背景颜色相对单一反差大的情况，太复杂的还得结合别的方法
按照我说的原则， 就是要通过提高contrast来抠图， 这个例子下面的身体因为没有什么飞散的头发， 那么直接用magic lasso工具（youtube）上有教程把主体抠出， 或者钢笔， 右键做选区也可以
1 ctrl+j copy 还是复制layer
2 点击channel来看需要用的通道
3 点击image －》 calculation, 选择一个green， 一个blue做计算， layer mode选overlay， softlight都可以， 这一组的layermode都是对比模式， 这样产生一个alpha 通道
4 用levels， curvel改变这个alpha channel， 让黑的更黑， 白的更白， 注意， 还有一些细节怎么办， 选工具栏里的dodge tool， 在需要fine tune的地方大概10%的透明度蹭蹭酒可以了
让后ctrl＋click这个alpha通道， 选区就做好了
我用了DODGE，BURN 和BRUSH。
这个怎么选取还有一些小技巧， 比如用一点点gaussian blur。。。这样可以模糊过渡区域对mask进行修饰
比如最后都差不多了， 建立一个新的layer， color mode, 用20%的笔刷用背景色刷一刷毛发过渡的地方。
建立空白层， layer mode -> color
按下字母b（brush）， 2（20%）， 刷
ps里这样
1 ctr+j copy layer 防止砸了
2 select -> color range->点吸管选区背景颜色， 选择后按OK
3 按住shift+i inverse selection（你要选的是你的大头）
4 select->modify->contract 一个pixel或者2个pixel（沿着轮廓缩进去一两个像素， 精选边沿）
5 ctrl+j copy
6 create a new layer, fill color(usually blue)拖到复制出来的大头下面就可以了
找个单色背景拍照，尽量和人的反差大点
ps打开图片，把那个background解锁成一个可编辑的图层
在通道面板里面找个人和背景反差最大（背景最白，人最黑）的通道（比如blue)，复制一份
选中复制的通道（blue copy），ctrl+I 反色，这时候背景是黑的，人是灰度的（黑头发的地方白，其他地方看原来颜色深浅灰度不同，颜色越浅越黑）
可以ctrl+M调调曲线让反差更大（背景更黑）
确认背景色是白色，前景色是黑色，然后用橡皮擦小心翼翼的把人擦白（凡是白色的都会进选区），边缘小心点，然后颠倒前景色和背景色，用橡皮擦吧背景擦黑
做完了选中RGB通道,回到图层面板，Select--->load selection
弹出窗口里面channel选你复制和编辑过的那个通道（比如blue copy），ok
这时候选区就好了
ctrl+shift+J,把选好的地方抠出来变成新图层
选取原来的图层（扣掉一块那个，layer 0），shift+f5填充一个你想要的颜色，然后调调颜色透明度之类如果需要的话
合并图层，保存
其实选区是关键，所以擦黑擦白的时候决定了最后选区的准确性，擦错了也会缺一块或者多一块
这个办法只适合于对象和背景颜色相对单一反差大的情况，太复杂的还得结合别的方法
按照我说的原则， 就是要通过提高contrast来抠图， 这个例子下面的身体因为没有什么飞散的头发， 那么直接用magic lasso工具（youtube）上有教程把主体抠出， 或者钢笔， 右键做选区也可以
1 ctrl+j copy 还是复制layer
2 点击channel来看需要用的通道
3 点击image －》 calculation, 选择一个green， 一个blue做计算， layer mode选overlay， softlight都可以， 这一组的layermode都是对比模式， 这样产生一个alpha 通道
4 用levels， curvel改变这个alpha channel， 让黑的更黑， 白的更白， 注意， 还有一些细节怎么办， 选工具栏里的dodge tool， 在需要fine tune的地方大概10%的透明度蹭蹭酒可以了
让后ctrl＋click这个alpha通道， 选区就做好了
我用了DODGE，BURN 和BRUSH。
这个怎么选取还有一些小技巧， 比如用一点点gaussian blur。。。这样可以模糊过渡区域对mask进行修饰
比如最后都差不多了， 建立一个新的layer， color mode, 用20%的笔刷用背景色刷一刷毛发过渡的地方。
建立空白层， layer mode -> color
按下字母b（brush）， 2（20%）， 刷
Tuesday, May 19, 2015
Friday, May 8, 2015
单亲妈妈脑癌复发 为7岁儿子准备好成年衣服(图)
单亲妈妈脑癌复发 为7岁儿子准备好成年衣服(图)
新闻来源: 现代快报 于 2015-05-08 20:17:26
徐蕾帮儿子买了好多长大后要穿的衣服
脑癌复发后，家住淮海路社区的单亲妈妈徐蕾来不及为自己伤心。锻炼7岁的儿子一个人睡觉，教他穿衣服叠被子，送他去学跆拳道……她与时间赛跑，希望把儿子尽快培养成一个能独当一面的“男子汉”。
“我不能把钱都拿去看病了。”徐蕾还写了遗嘱，把财产都留给了儿子。可是，作为妈妈，她仍然觉得做得不够，她把儿子成年以后要穿的衣服，都准备好了。在母亲节即将来临之际，让我们为这位伟大的母亲祈福，为伟大的母爱点赞。实习生 罗欣然 现代快报记者 钟晓敏/文
为照顾妈妈，她手术后没敢化疗
“她不仅是好母亲，也是好女儿。”街坊邻居都这么夸徐蕾。
徐蕾在单亲家庭中长大。爸爸在她10岁时因病去世，是妈妈一个人含辛茹苦，将她拉扯大。妈妈在1997年被查出了肝硬化，当时，徐蕾已在上海找到一份稳定的工作，为了妈妈，她毅然辞职，回到南京，回到了妈妈的身边。
妈妈从2006年开始就经常昏迷不醒，还伴有多种并发症。徐蕾边工作，边照顾妈妈，从不言累。祸不单行。2012年10月，徐蕾发现自己整天犯困，浑身无力。去医院一检查，竟是患上了脑癌。
害怕妈妈担心，不想让儿子小小年龄就承担太大压力，手术期间，徐蕾没让妈妈和儿子去过一趟医院。她选择一个人面对病魔。手术后，她只选择放疗，没有做化疗。
“如果化疗，我就没有力气再照顾妈妈了。”徐蕾说，没死之前，她必须担负起照顾妈妈的责任。手术放疗后，徐蕾经常头痛、脑鸣，并出现癫痫并发症。她仍坚持每天骑电动车，往返家和医院，护理妈妈，给妈妈送吃的喝的，直到去年2月妈妈昏迷再也没能醒来为止。
与时间赛跑，她希望多陪陪儿子
第一次手术前，徐蕾就写好遗书。她想给儿子的童年注满美好和欢乐。妈妈去世后，她强打起精神，尽量多带儿子出去玩。爬长城、到天安门广场看升旗仪式、逛动物园、泡温泉……她给儿子拍了很多开心大笑的照片。
担心儿子太小，没有能力守好家产，她写了遗嘱，将房产、存款都做了公证，又给儿子买了一份保险。“等他18岁的时候，每年就能从保险公司拿一笔钱了。”
儿子1岁多时，徐蕾和丈夫就离婚了。为了儿子今后不被欺负，她送儿子学跆拳道。多年来，儿子习惯晚上跟她一起睡觉。春节前，徐蕾脑癌复发，她狠下心来，让儿子一个人睡一个房间。她还教儿子自己穿衣服、叠被子。她还想教儿子淘米、煮饭、下面条。她还给儿子买了很多衣服，“他才一米四，我把他以后长到一米七的衣服都准备好了。”
为了让儿子有一点心理准备，这一次复发后，她还把真实的病情告诉了儿子。儿子一下子变得懂事很多，已经会安慰妈妈了，还不止一次问：“是不是我让你高兴一点，你的癌细胞就会少一点？”他鼓励妈妈，一定要勇敢。
“我多么想让他快快长大。”徐蕾说，她希望尽可能活得久一点，多陪儿子几年。
新闻来源: 现代快报 于 2015-05-08 20:17:26
徐蕾帮儿子买了好多长大后要穿的衣服
脑癌复发后，家住淮海路社区的单亲妈妈徐蕾来不及为自己伤心。锻炼7岁的儿子一个人睡觉，教他穿衣服叠被子，送他去学跆拳道……她与时间赛跑，希望把儿子尽快培养成一个能独当一面的“男子汉”。
“我不能把钱都拿去看病了。”徐蕾还写了遗嘱，把财产都留给了儿子。可是，作为妈妈，她仍然觉得做得不够，她把儿子成年以后要穿的衣服，都准备好了。在母亲节即将来临之际，让我们为这位伟大的母亲祈福，为伟大的母爱点赞。实习生 罗欣然 现代快报记者 钟晓敏/文
为照顾妈妈，她手术后没敢化疗
“她不仅是好母亲，也是好女儿。”街坊邻居都这么夸徐蕾。
徐蕾在单亲家庭中长大。爸爸在她10岁时因病去世，是妈妈一个人含辛茹苦，将她拉扯大。妈妈在1997年被查出了肝硬化，当时，徐蕾已在上海找到一份稳定的工作，为了妈妈，她毅然辞职，回到南京，回到了妈妈的身边。
妈妈从2006年开始就经常昏迷不醒，还伴有多种并发症。徐蕾边工作，边照顾妈妈，从不言累。祸不单行。2012年10月，徐蕾发现自己整天犯困，浑身无力。去医院一检查，竟是患上了脑癌。
害怕妈妈担心，不想让儿子小小年龄就承担太大压力，手术期间，徐蕾没让妈妈和儿子去过一趟医院。她选择一个人面对病魔。手术后，她只选择放疗，没有做化疗。
“如果化疗，我就没有力气再照顾妈妈了。”徐蕾说，没死之前，她必须担负起照顾妈妈的责任。手术放疗后，徐蕾经常头痛、脑鸣，并出现癫痫并发症。她仍坚持每天骑电动车，往返家和医院，护理妈妈，给妈妈送吃的喝的，直到去年2月妈妈昏迷再也没能醒来为止。
与时间赛跑，她希望多陪陪儿子
第一次手术前，徐蕾就写好遗书。她想给儿子的童年注满美好和欢乐。妈妈去世后，她强打起精神，尽量多带儿子出去玩。爬长城、到天安门广场看升旗仪式、逛动物园、泡温泉……她给儿子拍了很多开心大笑的照片。
担心儿子太小，没有能力守好家产，她写了遗嘱，将房产、存款都做了公证，又给儿子买了一份保险。“等他18岁的时候，每年就能从保险公司拿一笔钱了。”
儿子1岁多时，徐蕾和丈夫就离婚了。为了儿子今后不被欺负，她送儿子学跆拳道。多年来，儿子习惯晚上跟她一起睡觉。春节前，徐蕾脑癌复发，她狠下心来，让儿子一个人睡一个房间。她还教儿子自己穿衣服、叠被子。她还想教儿子淘米、煮饭、下面条。她还给儿子买了很多衣服，“他才一米四，我把他以后长到一米七的衣服都准备好了。”
为了让儿子有一点心理准备，这一次复发后，她还把真实的病情告诉了儿子。儿子一下子变得懂事很多，已经会安慰妈妈了，还不止一次问：“是不是我让你高兴一点，你的癌细胞就会少一点？”他鼓励妈妈，一定要勇敢。
“我多么想让他快快长大。”徐蕾说，她希望尽可能活得久一点，多陪儿子几年。
Wednesday, May 6, 2015
Monday, May 4, 2015
Who invented piano?
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/04/google-doodle-marks-360th-birthday-of-piano-creator-bartolomeo-cristofori
Google’s latest doodle celebrates the 360th birthday of Bartolomeo Cristofori, the man widely credited with inventing the piano.
Cristofori was born in Padua on this day in 1655 in what was then the Republic of Venice.
According to Encyclopaedia Britannica, the instrument Cristofori invented was referred to during his lifetime as a harpsichord that plays soft and loud, from which its name is derived. In Italian, the phrase is gravicembalo col piano e forte.
On the blog dedicated to its doodles, Google wrote that one of Cristofori’s “biggest innovations was creating a hammer mechanism that struck the strings on a keyboard to create sound. The use of a hammer made it possible to produce softer or louder sounds depending upon how light or hard a player pressed on the keys”.
It added: “Being able to change the volume was a major breakthrough. And that’s exactly what doodler Leon Hong wanted to highlight in this interactive doodle.”
Cristofori’s entry in Encyclopaedia Britannica notes that little is known of his life and that his invention was not well known in his lifetime, even if it has since become ubiquitous.
It reads: “Cristofori apparently invented the piano around 1709, and, according to contemporary sources, four of his pianos existed in 1711.”
Scientific methodology
Axi, you should add more.
James Lind (4 Oct 1716 - 13 July 1794)
He found the cure for Scurvy through scientific experiments. The cure was drinking lemon juice.
Henry Beecher (4 Feb 1904 - 25 July 1976)
He found the placebo effect.
Double blind tests
Large sample size double blind tests
James Lind (4 Oct 1716 - 13 July 1794)
He found the cure for Scurvy through scientific experiments. The cure was drinking lemon juice.
Henry Beecher (4 Feb 1904 - 25 July 1976)
He found the placebo effect.
Double blind tests
Large sample size double blind tests
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